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The amount of data that is being generated continues to rapidly grow in size and 
complexity. Frameworks such as Apache Hadoop and Apache Spark are evolving at a 
rapid rate as organizations are building data driven applications to gain competitive 
advantages. Data analytics frameworks decompose problems with a large volume of data 
into smaller more manageable data sets to build applications that are more than just 
inference and can help make predictions as well as prescriptions to problems in real time 
instead of batch processes. For example, organizations like Netflix and Amazon use these 
frameworks to analyze their users.  
 Information Security is becoming more important to organizations as the Internet 
and cloud technologies become more integrated with their internal processes. The number 
of attacks and attack vectors has been increasing steadily over the years. Border defense 
measures (e.g. Intrusion Detection Systems) are no longer enough to identify and stop 
attackers. Data driven information security is not a new approach to solving information 
security; however there is an increased emphasis on combining heterogeneous sources to 
  
gain a broader view of the problem instead of isolated systems. Stitching together 
multiple alerts into a cohesive system can increase the number of true positives.  
 With the increased concern of unknown insider threats and zero-day attacks, 
identifying unknown attack vectors becomes more difficult. Previous research has shown 
that with as little as 10 commands, which deviate from a user’s normal behavior, it is 
possible to identify a masquerade attack against a user’s profile.  
This thesis is going to propose  a data driven information security architecture that 
relies on both behavioral analysis of SSH profiles and bad actor data collected from an 
SSH honeypot to identify bad actor attack vectors. Previous studies have used behavioral 
analysis in an attempt to identify masquerade attacks.  Multiple studies on POSIX Linux 
masquerade detection have used the Schonlau data set.  Simple changes in user behavior 
can create high false positives. 
Honeypot systems should not be used by normal users within an organization’s 
environment. Only bad actors are going to attempt to use the system. This experiment is 
going to collect bad actor behavior from a honeypot ensemble with normal user behavior 
to increase the true positive rate of bad actor detection. Using Apache Spark and Apache 
Hadoop, we can create a real time data driven architecture that can collect and analyze 
new bad actor behaviors from honeypot data and monitor legitimate user accounts to 
create predictive and prescriptive models. Previously unidentified attack vectors can be 
cataloged for review. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
New or unknown attack vectors are difficult for traditional border systems to 
detect.  There are two main types of detection systems: knowledge based and behavioral 
based. Knowledge based detection systems focus on previously known attacks [5]. 
Behavioral systems are anomaly based detection systems that take a user’s or accounts 
usage pattern and alerts when the behavior pattern deviates [53]. Due to the amount of 
data and how quick new attack vectors are discovered, they both have limitations causing 
high false positive rates [34].   
Cyber-attacks are continuously on the rise, and the complexity is constantly 
evolving. Throughout the news, people are hearing about how organizations are being 
breached and consumer data is constantly compromised by these attacks. Two security 
breaches in 2014 include Chase bank [50] and a payment data breach at Home Depot 
[49]. Both attacks are analyzed in Appendix C, and are classified as advanced persistent 
threats (APT). According to Virvilis, et al. there are other major attacks and malware that 
have enormous complexity and are highly sophisticated; including Stuxnet, Flame and 
Red October [62] were high profile malware [34]. Each of these programs was skillfully 
crafted and required a background in multiple technology domains.  
Detection of a network intrusion usually goes unnoticed for months. Some 
organizations believe that 71% of intrusions go undetected and some of the 29% of 
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detections don’t happen until on average of 10 months after the detections happen [8]. 
The actual numbers could be much higher, because most organizations rotate security 
logs after so many days, let alone being able to analyze months of network logs. Intrusion 
software will alert on events based on a preset configuration. Complex and skillfully 
crafted Advanced Persistent Threats can go completely undetected in an organization 
because the software needs to be configured to detect the signature of the attack.  
Near Real Time Data analytics systems, like Apache Spark, built on top of 
Hadoop can provide valuable insight into what kind of traffic is happening on a network. 
This paper will recommend an implementation with a sample architecture and analysis of 
real network logs. The paper will review literature related to both Advanced Persistent 
Threat detection and big data Analytics.  
Organizations increasingly leverage their Information Systems to glean as much 
information about their processes, customers, competitors and products.  Traditionally 
organizations have kept only the data they think will bring value to their stakeholders. As 
computing power increases and storage space becomes cheaper, companies have 
increased the variety and volume of data.  Another trend is that systems are becoming 
more interconnected. The data would stay and become consumed in one system. With 
new tools and frameworks data is more flexible and the way that we use Extraction, 
Transformation, and Load (ETL) tools and middleware technology to move data around 
between multiple systems. Cloud computing and server virtualization have enabled 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) providers to enable smaller organizations and give larger 
organizations flexibility in these various spaces. All these trends have pushed for 
companies to keep more and more data, which has caused an explosion in the world.  
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Advances in all these technologies have created the age of big data. Open source 
infrastructure and analytical frameworks are being utilized to wrangle and make sense of 
the large amounts of data. Some companies have become strong leaders by gaining a 
competitive advantage in their industries by using their vast amounts of data in 
innovative ways. These companies are sharing anywhere from partial abstractions of their 
systems to access of the source code making lowering the barrier of entry for new 
organizations or companies with an established reputation to enter into the big data 
analytics arena fairly quickly. 
Motivation 
Border penetration detection and prevention is not enough to defend organizations 
information assets. A majority of the attacks that have been in the media from 2011-2014 
were Advanced Persistent Threats that bypassed border security. Two of the more notable 
attacks in 2014 were against Home Depot [49] and Chase Bank [50]. Analysis of both 
attacks is in greater detail in Appendix C and Appendix D.  
An unknown/unintentional insider threat (UIT) and zero day attacks are raising 
concerns for organization’s information security [51]. An UIT is a classification of 
insider threat where an insider unknowingly compromises an information system. 
Research in the information security community focused on this sub classification of 
insider threat and potential behavioral indicators which can identify UIT is present within 
an organization [19]. UIT are major concerns for organizations and security professionals 
that have been focusing on border security because traditional border security does not 
detect or prevent these advanced persistent threats (i.e., UIT) [45]. 
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Zero day attacks occur between the times that vulnerability has been announced 
and before a patch has been applied. Hackers are constantly scanning the information on 
the Internet for vulnerabilities and quickly launch attacks against known compromised 
hosts (e.g. Apache server that is on an older version with known vulnerabilities).  
Attackers have been known to penetrate an organization’s border defenses, but they may 
wait to commit any malicious attacks until a zero-day vulnerability becomes known on 
the target’s system [5]. 
In both attacks on Chase and Home Depot (See Appendix C), the attackers were 
able to penetrate border security and masquerade with legitimate credentials. Home 
Depot’s attack originated from a third party vendor that Home Depot was partnered with. 
Attacks that originate from a third party are becoming more common as organizations are 
embracing cloud computing and buying software over to build software policies.  
The number of security breaches for organizations are on the rise. In a 2013 
survey conducted by SANS with 647 responses over 65% of the respondents responded 
that APT was the reason for expanding their Information Security Systems to collect logs 
and respond to more than just boarder attacks. Multiple APT attacks in 2014 were caused 
by UIT, see Appendix C. The reasons for not being able to discover attacks were: “lack 
of system awareness/vulnerability awareness, lack of relevant event context to observe 
normal behavior, lack of skills/training, difficulties with normalization, and cost of 
storage and analysis [32]. 
Machine learning and statistical analysis can be used to help identify attacks. 
Over the last twenty years data analytics techniques have been used heavily within 
information security; however, they have primarily been geared towards border controls. 
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Intrusion detection/prevention systems employ a variety of anomaly based behavior 
detection using Markov Chains and behavioral analysis [53].  
Most of these techniques are employed against network traffic and not application 
data. In the past sensor (e.g. IDS, IPS or Honeypot) data alone has been very challenging 
to analyze accurately due to the speed that network traffic generates and analytics 
systems haven’t been able to respond quickly [2]. Also, the amount of traffic causes some 
issues as hackers have adapted their techniques so that they are attack at a slower rate so 
that the attack data becomes hidden [8]. 
With the decreased cost of storage and computational power as well as 
frameworks such as Hadoop, HBase (which is a variant of Google’s BigTable [9]), and 
Apache Spark some of the traditional challenges in analyzing large volumes of network 
and security data are overcome [1]. There have been numerous models that have been 
theorized between 2013 and 2015, which can now be leveraged with the right data 
analytics tools, but those techniques will bring their own challenges to information 
security [42]. 
The literature in 2014 on information security analytics has increased heavily and 
there were a multitude of books published in 2014-2015 on this subject: Data-Driven 
Security: Analysis, Visualization and Dashboards;  Network security with NetFlow and 
IPFIX, Information Security Analytics: Finding Security Insights, Patterns and 
Anomalies in big data are just to name a few [32]. The books mentioned; however, don’t 
really have an answer on solutions to problems using data; they are geared towards an 
intersection on data analytics and information security. Specifically, the books are geared 
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towards getting information security professionals “up to speed” on data analytics 
techniques using the more popular tools. 
Even with these books there is still a gap on what to do with the tools and 
information security data. Due to the vast amount of content released with very little to 
offer in solutions, it is a good area to try new techniques and think about solving 
information security threats from a different angle. These tools make it a lot easier to 
disparate data sources and tying different events to a probable threat using ensemble 
methods [44]. 
This thesis is going to use multiple different sources of data to help detect 
probable unknown insider threats using heterogeneous data sets and data analytics tools 
that scale – Hadoop and Spark. Detecting UIT has been attempted on a small scale and 
with simulated data [45]. This experiment is with a Linux Honeypot that is used to collect 
attacker behavior data and Linux Shell data, and ties the sources together to make 
attacker predictions. Using a Honeypot can be advantageous because data collected could 
be a new or unknown attack vector. Doing the analysis alone isn’t enough. The reasons 
these technologies are used in this experiment are because it’s possible to create an 
intelligent information system that can act upon the analysis. 
Thesis Organization 
The following chapters will include information on big data technologies, 
terminology and topics.  
 Chapter 1: Introduction – Motivation and Introduction. 
 Chapter 2:  Review of Related Literature –The literature is going to review both 
big data analytics and advanced persistence threats. 
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 Chapter 3: Hadoop Ecosystem – Hadoop has many components that are 
constantly being added to and each have their own use cases. 
 Chapter 4: Experiment Architecture – The environment uses the Hadoop 
Ecosystem, and a Honeypot to collect logs. 
 Chapter 5: Analysis of the Experiment – Review the results of the Experiment. 
 Chapter 6: Conclusion – Conclusion based on the Experiment and 
recommendations for future studies. 
 Appendix – Will contain custom development scripts.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The experiment presented within this thesis utilizes big data frameworks on an 
information security problem. Therefore the literature analyzed for this paper includes 
both big data Analytics as well as Advanced Persistent Threats in Information Security. 
There is a lot of information on both topics; however, there are very few papers that 
combine the two. There are many approaches to security where using big data Analytics 
is unnecessary. Doing analytics on a large volume of network traffic or even Security 
Alert Events can glean more information than be yielded by one individual monitoring 
tool. Implementation of big data Analytics frameworks is starting to be integrated into 
existing Security Information and Event Management  systems, for example at the end of 
2013 Zions Bancorporation released attended implementation of Hadoop cluster with 
intelligence tools to parse through data quicker. 
The related literature will focus on both Advanced Persistent Threats and big data 
Analytics. Both fields are very active and are constantly evolving. First, this thesis will 
discuss the impact of information security breaches will be analyzed to show that this is a 
big problem in the real world.  Continuing it will also discuss Advanced Persistent 
Threats and current ways they are handled in research as well as in the industry. Next, 
this chapter will look at how network security is a big data issue. Big data will be defined 
and an overview of the various big data analytics tools will be provided. Lastly, the 
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chapter will highlight on how some of the Security tools have integrated big data 
appliances into their current frameworks.   
Impact of Information Security Breaches 
Coverage over large scale Security breaches in the media has been rising 
significantly in the last few years. Giant retail chains have become the target of numerous 
security attacks. Another security breach that was highlighted by the media was when 
former government contractor Edward J. Snowden released NSA architecture used to spy 
on United States citizens.  Cyber surveillance has caused much interest in the general 
public as many businesses, governments and other institutions have been the leak of 
consumer information. What makes information security even more of an interesting 
topic is “it is estimated that as many as 71% of compromises go undetected [8].” 
Larger companies tend to find intrusion events compared to smaller firms. 
Companies with less than $100 million in revenue detected on average of 1,091 incidents, 
Medium size companies ($100 million - $1 billion) detected over 4,227 incidents, and 
large companies detected on average 13,138 incidents in 2014 [8]. Cyber threats to 
smaller and medium sized businesses are a threat to the large companies though, because 
oftentimes the smaller companies are interconnected with the larger companies that they 
are trading partners.  
Not only are the number of security incidents and threats to organizations on the 
rise, but the amount it is costing organizations is increasing as well. As more and more 
security incidents become publicized, organizations are increasing their attention on 
managing, mitigating and preventing cyber security threats and losses. It’s estimated that 
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“the average financial loss attributed to cybersecurity incidents in 2014 was $2.7 million 
[8].” 
Cyber security threats are not just from external hackers, foreign nation-states, 
competitors, information brokers, organized crime, etc. Insiders, e.g. current employees, 
former employees, trading partners and customers are also a threat to an organization’s 
information assets. The percentage of incidents attributed to current and former 
consultants/contractors was around 18% [8].  With incidents involving Snowden and 
Manning in the United States military leaking government documents those organizations 
are trying to understand how to handle insider threats. Organizations have not been 
monitoring insider threat as much as they have been focusing on outsider’s breaking into 
their networks.  
When taking into account insider threats coupled with external threats, 
information security professionals need to consider more than just the technological 
approaches to keep threats external to the network contained to the perimeter of their 
networks. Organizations and security professionals tend to focus on the technological 
aspects of Information Security [34]. There is research in InfoSec field that takes into 
account socio-organizational concerns instead of the technical aspect. “Behavioral 
InfoSec research is a subfield of the broader InfoSec field that focuses on the behaviors 
of individuals which relate to protecting information and information assets, which 
includes computer hardware, networking infrastructure and organizational information 
[13].”  
The behavioral information security approach considers separating insider normal 
behavior from abnormal behavior and understanding the behaviors of external attacks. 
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With insiders still being a significant threat to information assets, there are two different 
types of behaviors that are identified “deviant –such as sabotage, stealing, and industrial 
or political espionage” or “misbehavior – selecting simple passwords, visiting non-work 
related websites, inadvertently posting confidential data on unsecured servers, or 
carelessly clicking phishing links on emails and websites[13].” Understanding these 
different behaviors can improve an organization’s understanding on how their employees 
use internal resources.   
Advanced Persistent Threats 
An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a targeted attack against physical 
systems; usually the systems that are targeted have a high monetary value to an 
organization. Most APT attackers operate in a “Low-and-Slow” mode of operation. 
“Low” means that they hide themselves within normal network traffic, thus making the 
traffic appear to blend in with normal traffic. “Slow” means that the attack has a long 
execution time. These attacks hide themselves and are in for the long-run to break into a 
system. This is vastly different from the mass-spreading worms, viruses, Trojans and bot-
nets. Most of the time, organizations are oblivious to any intrusion done by APTs. Most 
of the attacks involve stolen user credentials or zero-day exploits to avoid any alerts that 
the Intrusion Detection Software would transmit [1].  
APTs are some of the more sophisticated and serious security threats to an 
organization today. APTs are becoming even more sophisticated and use a variety of 
methods and technologies, including Social-Engineering to use an organization’s own 
employees to penetrate the various systems within the organization’s firewalls. The major 
challenge in detecting an APT attack is that there are massive amounts of network data 
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that are stored in various systems within organizations. Some of the systems include: 
firewall logs, intrusion detection systems, network switches and routers, application logs, 
domain controllers and VPN logs. Most of the time logs are analyzed in isolation and not 
used for correlation purposes.  
Zero-day attacks are one of the biggest threats to an organization, due to the fact 
that most intrusion detection systems need to be pre-configured to detect a signature of a 
specific attack. Zero-day exploits, by definition are exploits that haven’t been identified 
and the day that they are identified publically is known as “day zero.” Criminal 
organizations look at unpatched software such as Microsoft Office to target 
vulnerabilities. Two recent Zero-Day attacks that had a lot of media attention were: 
Heartbleed, and Shellshock. Both affected a majority of Internet Linux systems, because 
the first uses a bug in OpenSSL, which is used in most open source software and the 
second is found in Bash, which has been a popular shell for Linux for over twenty years. 
There have been a lot of research done recently on the study of zero-day attacks, 
specifically; Bilge and Dumitras from Symantec have released a study on “Zero-Day 
Attacks in the Real World.” Their research introduced a technique using the Worldwide 
Intelligence Network Environment (WINE), to identify and detect zero-day attacks [5]. 
The lifecycle of an attack is that first a vulnerability is introduced into the 
software, usually it is an overlooked area of the software. If someone outside the 
organization discovers the vulnerability, it is then exploited in the wild. Once the exploit 
or vulnerability is discovered by the vendor they normally create a patch for it. When the 
vendor releases a patch it’s normally disclosed publically. After the patch and disclosure 
happen, anti-virus software and intrusion detection software creates a signature to detect 
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the exploit being used against an organizations systems [5]. Detecting attacks against an 
organizations system is hard to do with traditional methods, especially if organizations 
are relying on their antivirus and intrusion detection systems to detect software only after 
the signature has been released by the vendors. 
  
Figure 1. Typical Path of Zero-Day Attack 
Honeypots 
Honeypots can be very useful when trying to detect any type of malicious activity 
between firewall domains as well as exposed to the Internet. They allow security 
professionals to gather data from external sources. They are being used heavily in 
research in the Information Security Industry as well as academia. Honeypots alone 
aren’t enough to identify and deter attacks, but should be used ensemble as another 
technology to aid in detection and prevention [54]. 
Honeypots have been used for two primary reasons: research and production. 
Research honeypots have been used by the information security and academia in order to 
understand cyber threats. Production honeypots are what organizations are using to help 
mitigate risks [26]. These systems can take on many forms from a clone web site to an 
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interactive Linux shell. There is one organization “The Honeypot Project” that is an 
international volunteer organization that shares tools and techniques to aid in the research 
of information security [56]. The tools range from the various types of honeypots to 
"tcpdump” analysis tools. Overall most of the systems are fairly simple and focus on 
collecting very specific data sets, and can be used to identify new tools and tactics. One 
of the challenges is that it is difficult to identify new tactics with honeypots alone.  
They can be very useful to identify network sensor data and trends. Honeypot data 
can be combined within an organization or combining the data with honeypots that exists 
within other organization as there have been research using honeypots to identify insider 
threats [54]. Attack trends can be identified by employing a Honeypot within a network, 
for example - an attack that is originating from an IP shows up on honeypots that are 
distributed across the Internet. A majority of the research on honeypots are still used to 
detect external threats. 
There are numerous issues and challenges when deploying honeypots, especially 
at scale. Some of the high level issues with managing and utilizing the data from 
honeypots are: deploying new honeypots, setting up data feeds into a centralized location, 
storing and indexing the data in a usable format, correlating the data with heterogeneous 
data sources and real-time visualization [26]. Some of the advantages are: they use 
minimal resources, gather only the data that is necessary to analyze a specific problem, 
they can be simple (Although heterogeneous network of sensors can quickly become 
complex), and they can help discover new attack vectors. 
Detecting insider threats is a combination of information security policy and 
information security technology. Fine detail user access controls alone aren’t enough to 
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deter an attacker, nor does it make a system impenetrable. Solving the problem of 
unknown insider threat takes multiple techniques. Using a honeypot internal and external 
to model potential attacks can aid in the technological detection of unintended insider 
threats [55]. Combined with data analytics honeypot behavioral data using ensemble 
methods for accuracy of detection can aid in identifying attacks [13].  
Information Security as a Big Data Problem 
The definition of big data will be defined in greater detail; however, there is the 
question on whether or not network intrusion traffic is classified as big data. There are a 
multitude of vendors that are starting to provide an extension to connect the data to a big 
data Analytics framework, most commonly used is Hadoop. These types of frameworks 
are causing companies to re-think how they store and use data within physical products as 
well as digital products [25]. Hadoop has been the solution to the issues in order to 
analyze data. Solving problems that were once not solvable due to the volume, velocity 
and variety of data is where the real value of these frameworks like Hadoop makes their 
mark [27].  
Some data analytics will not gain any benefit from using a big data Analytics 
solution and there are techniques that are more than efficient for data analytics on smaller 
data sets.  Based on the definition of big data discussed below, it is important whether or 
not network intrusion is classified as a big data problem, before trying to apply a big data 
Analytics solution. Using HDFS along with Public Cloud storage models can be used to 
store large amounts of data that can be used to analyze network data [20]. The following 
topology is a recommendation for storing and analyzing network data [35]. 
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Figure 2.2 has three major components: data ingest; user interface and the 
analytics processing engine. Different data pipelines are heterogeneous data sources 
across the enterprise. The data is ingested into HDFS sorted by the type of data. The user 
interface allows for ad hoc analytics or for viewing the variety of data sources. Analysis 
system can be a mix between real time and batch processing against the various data 
sources [35].
 
Figure 2. Big Data Framework for Networks 
Networking challenges is trying to minimize the communication cost, while 
storing, processing and retrieving data that will be used in security analytics.  Figure 2 
that is abstracted to one system; however, in reality the logs come from application logs, 
operating system logs, firewall logs and intrusion detection logs. The variety of the raw 
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data that will be analyzed is what separates big data Analytics for security from 
traditional intrusion detection systems which will store “Events” that are triggered from a 
set of criterion. Analyzing the data from the various heterogeneous sources can be solved 
using big data analytics frameworks such as the Hadoop Ecosystem. 
Organizations are increasingly collecting more and more security information. 
The majority of the security logs and event data are collected for various reasons; 
however the top reasons are: “Detecting and tracking suspicious behavior, supporting 
forensic analysis and correlation, preventing incidents, and achieving compliance with 
regulatory requirements [33].”  Traditional security platforms are now trying to leverage 
the power of big data analytics platforms, creating more than known attack vector 
prevention; however, these systems are still in their infancy.  Many of these platforms are 
currently being used for exploratory data analysis. These systems require security 
analysts with a background in both security and analytics manually configuring the 
system. Due to the manual nature of these systems numerous security events go 
unnoticed.  
What is Big Data and How Big is Big Data 
Increasing computational power enables organizations to produce so much data 
that it is causing an explosion in the amount of data that is stored on servers. 
Organizations are starting to keep data that wouldn’t even be considered for archiving. 
New areas of data creation such as social networking, embedded devices, and smart 
phones are also contributing to the amount of data that is out there. This overwhelming 
amount of data created is creating a paradigm shift and what some would consider “the 
era of big data” [30].  
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Big data is a buzzword that many people use, but don’t really understand the 
meaning of it. This is a newer term that is used to reference datasets that are so large that 
they do not fit well with traditional databases, primarily Relational Database 
Management Systems (RDBMS).  Since technology is constantly evolving it’s 
impossible to define “big data” by a specific amount or size of data, but it can be defined 
where the size of the data cannot reasonably be analyzed on machine, but needs to be 
distributed across several machines. 
A 2010 McKinsey Quarterly has a report, many of the technologies and trends are 
related to the growth in big data. The trends that are leading to the growth in big data are: 
Distributed cocreation moves into the mainstream, making the network the organization, 
the growing of the internet of things, imagining anything as a service, the age of the 
multisided business model, and Experimentation and big data [7]. Many of these 
technologies are a byproduct of Cloud technologies. Enterprises are leveraging more and 
more systems external to the organization’s systems.  
Big data is discussed in the middle of the article; however, over half of the 
technologies mentioned in the article feed the growth of big data. Internet companies, 
such as Google and Yahoo, are the pioneers of big data research and experimentation; 
however, “Companies selling physical products are also using big data for rigorous 
experimentation [7].” Organizations are experimenting with social networks, their 
internal networks, the Internet of Things, and correlated data to gain competitive 
advantages against in their various industries. As of 2014 these trends are only growing 
as more organizations are leveraging these various dispersed heterogeneous sources of 
new data. 
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Big data is still in its infancy. It is estimated that digital data growth between 2009 
and 2020 will grow 44-fold to 35ZB per year [37]. The systems that are processing big 
data today don’t revolve around a single technology, platform, architecture, or use. 
Although, companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter seem to be the companies that 
have pioneered a lot of the technology revolving around big data, other industries such as 
healthcare and manufacturing are trying to gain a competitive advantage by leveraging 
big data analytics frameworks, such as Hadoop [39]. 
Cloud companies in particular have been taking advantage of big data platforms, 
by optimizing custom environments so that their customers can start using those 
frameworks quickly. VMWare, for example, optimized their product for big data 
analytics frameworks. Then VMWare ran a performance study as they want organizations 
to leverage their systems without the reservation that those frameworks don’t run as 
optimal on cloud based infrastructure instead of specific hardware [6]. 
There are three attributes of big data, commonly known as the “Three Vs of big 
data [16],” are Volume, Variety, and Velocity. Figure 2.1 – 3Vs of big data show a quick 
visual on how the different Vs relate to big data. Gartner analyzed that these are the three 
areas when qualifying and analyzing big data.  Although, the 3V model isn’t the only 
way to view the classification of big data, it is a useful framework that is recognized by 
many Data Scientists within the field. Information Security data is definitely classified by 
all three [1]. 
 Often users will cite all three areas when trying to understand the data that is 
being analyzed by the big data analytics frameworks. The growth in each: Volume, 
Variety and Velocity of data are the focus behind the MapReduce and Distributed File 
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System paradigm that many big data analytics frameworks attempt to solve, which will 
be explored further in this thesis. 
Volume is the easiest of the three to understand and quantify. Traditionally data 
sets have been in the megabytes and gigabyte range. Traditional enterprise volume has 
come from transactional data being stored into relational database management systems. 
Newer volumes are coming from non-traditional areas, primarily due to Internet 
technologies. Log files that used to be archived off or deleted are now being stored in 
permanent data stores. Before current data analytics platforms too much volume has been 
an issue for analytics departments. According to a study by Booz & Company, structured 
data volumes are continue to rising; however unstructured data makes up 80% of the 
world’s data [28]. 
The second V is Velocity. Velocity refers to how fast a data is being produced as 
well as how fast the data must be analyzed to meet demand. When the data is being 
produced faster than it can be analyzed this is when new technologies and algorithms 
need to be used in order to process the data.  Legacy systems have primarily processed 
data in batch.  Recent trends using Internet technologies have begun to process data while 
it aggregates into the system, e.g. streaming data analytics. Streaming data analytics 
provides challenges for even the more popular data analytics infrastructure frameworks.  
The final and most complex portion of the 3V model is Variety, which refers to 
the type of data that is being stored.  There are three categories on the Variety of data.  
Structured data means that the data is modelled and will be in the expected format. 
RDBMS uses data normalization techniques in order to reduce redundancy and 
dependency; however, this makes the data very rigorous and structured. RDBMS data 
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may have some complexities when data scientists need to run analysis on the data; but 
there is a standard query language, SQL, that enables data scientists to be able to mine 
data from a RDBMS, due to the structured nature of the data [16]. 
The second category of Variety, semi-structured data, would include data formats 
such as XML, JSON, and video data. There are other “standard” document protocols 
including EDI and Rosetta-net, that would also be considered semi-structured. Data in 
this category has a structure to it, but can be very flexible on how the data is structured 
from one instance to the next. Semi-structured data can still be mined, but it takes a lot 
more work to run analysis against the data than against an SQL database. Due to the 
ubiquity of JSON, XML and EDI there are many commercial and open source parsers 
that make it easier for data scientists to sift through the semi-structured nature of the data.  
Unstructured is the third category of Variety, and is the most difficult to do data 
analysis against. Companies harnessing the power of big data analytics frameworks have 
been trying to build systems that make analysis on unstructured data easier. This type of 
data can include: text files, logs, social media posts, telematics information, excel 
documents, pdf documents, and photos. Unstructured data have been mostly ignored until 
recent advances in technologies. Organizations are now trying to figure out how to gain a 
competitive advantage on the unstructured data that is being thrown away and could 
potentially provide a competitive advantage [28].  
Organizations are not gaining a competitive advantage with just one type of data. 
They are now trying to see how the various sources of unstructured data relate to their 
structured and semi-structured data.  Unstructured data alone will not provide value to 
 22 
 
organizations, but will provide value in parallel with their current data warehouse and 
data analytics systems [11]. 
Gartner’s three V model for defining big data Analytics is just one way to define 
and model big data analytics. Another model is the HACE Theorem. “HACE big data 
starts with large-volume, heterogeneous [H], autonomous [A], sources with distributed 
and decentralized control, and seeks to explore complex [C] and evolving [E] 
relationships among data [43].” According to Wu, these characteristics help determine 
the challenges for making useful information from big data. There are some overlap 
between the HACE theorem and the 3V model, which will be examined in the next 
section. 
Heterogeneous data relates to Variety of data in the 3V model. The different types 
of data arrive because each information system has its own schemas and protocols. Due 
to the variety of data, it makes it difficult to for analytics systems to make sense of the 
data.  One of the major challenges of big data analytics frameworks is to overcome the 
heterogeneity and diverse dimensionality issues when aggregating the data into a 
meaningful output. 
Data in modern information systems are generated from distributed and 
decentralized areas. The Internet has proven organizations do not need to rely solely upon 
the data that resides within their infrastructure. Each source needs to generate and collect 
data without any command center. Autonomous sources are necessary in order to solve 
many of the technological challenges of distributed systems and scaling. 
Evolving relationships underneath the data become even more difficult as the 
volume and variety of data increases. Finding and connecting relationships becomes one 
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of the major challenges in Data Analytics systems. This challenge is amplified as 
organizations are consuming more and more data that is created and modelled external to 
their organization. It is important to take these key characteristics of the complex and 
evolving data into consideration when trying to gain insight into diverse data sources 
without clear relationships. 
Even though the HACE theorem has some overlap with the 3V model, it is very 
useful when analyzing the characteristics of big data. Using the HACE Theorem, when 
mining big data it’s important to take in to consideration three separate properties of the 
big data systems: data accessing and computing, data privacy and domain knowledge, 
and big data mining algorithms [43]. These three areas will be discussed in the Data 
Mining and Algorithms section of this thesis.  
 
Figure 3. Big Data Processing Frameworks 
Data Mining and Algorithms 
Business Intelligence and Analytics have gone through three major generations 
based on how the data is approached. Chen, Chiang and Storey wrote a paper for MIS 
Quarterly – December 2012: “Business Intelligence and Analytics [11]: From Big Data to 
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Big Impact,” which discussions the evolution of Business Intelligence and Enterprise 
analytics. At the end of the article the authors include a table of emerging research in the 
field. Although research in artificial intelligence and data analytics has been around since 
the 1950’s, Business Intelligence didn’t become a popular term until the 90’s. More 
recently big data and big analytics have been used popularly due to the volume, velocity 
and variety of data that are being stored within enterprises.  
BI&A 1.0 has been around for as long as database reporting. Data in this category 
are mostly structured, collected through legacy systems. Data is often stored on the file 
system or a traditional Relational Database Management System (RDBMS).  Many of the 
statistical techniques in this category have been around since the early 1970s and have 
been heavily used up through the 1990’s. Data-marts and data-warehouses have been 
designed to aggregate and analyze the data. Extraction, transformation and Load (ETL) 
tools have been used to convert and integrate the data into a specified format. 
BI&A 2.0: Web technologies during 98 – 2003 caused an explosion in the amount 
of data generated by organizations. Internet technologies presented a unique way that 
data was being generated, stored and analyzed. Companies such as Google, Yahoo, 
Amazon and eBay, began taking advantage of data that fell outside the traditional way of 
storing and analyzing the data. Web Intelligence, web analytics, and user-generated 
content through Internet Applications centered on unstructured text and created 
challenges and opportunities for the analytics community. The biggest difference from 
BI&A 1.0 and BI&A 2.0 are the amounts of unstructured data that cannot be easily stored 
and analyzed within a RDBMS. Web 2.0 applications that generate the data include: 
social media, forums, web blogs, social networking, socio-political comments, images, 
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video, and voice. Customers are creating content that can now be searched, where 
previous analytics systems analyzed data created by the enterprises. 
BI&A 3.0: Identified around 2011 due to the number of mobile devices including 
phones and tablets surpassing the number of Laptops and PCs. The number of people 
always connected to the Internet ushered a momentum in the amount of data created. 
Software is in everything we do at this point. There are complete software packages for 
multiple domain areas, from mobile games to enterprise application software to social 
media. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) barcodes and radio tags have helped 
creates a trend known as “the Internet of Things (IoT).” These devices are in the cars 
people drive and can even be inside of wearable devices that are used to track a users’ 
progress in their fitness routine. The underlying BI&A in this era will stem around 
mobile analytics with location and context aware sensors. Analysis will be able to 
visualize and bring together data from multiple sources [11]. 
The third column shows the emerging research, which is current day. According 
to Chen, et al. the major areas of research are: big data Analytics, Text Analytics, Web 
Analytics, Network Analytics, and Mobile Analytics. Software defined networking and 
newer network technologies have been embracing big data frameworks to analyze data 
that would have once been considered too large to analyze as a whole [32]. A majority of 
these emerging research areas stem from Internet Technologies. These areas aren’t just 
being researched at Universities or just for experimentation, but are being 
commercialized by industry and government. Some utility companies are starting to 
collect sensor data that enable predictive and prescriptive analytics for consumers [12]. 
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Figure 4. BI&A Overview: Evolution, Applications, and Emerging Research [11] 
 
Figure 4 represents the Foundational Technologies and research in those various 
areas.  Chen, et al. provided multiple areas based on the opportunities of emerging and 
exciting applications that have shared excitement in the various research communities. 
They classify the research opportunities into five critical technical areas.  
Big data analytics include running algorithms such as: cover classification, 
clustering, regression, association analysis and network analysis over data sets so large 
that big data analytics frame works such as MapReduce are required in order to analyze 
the datasets [23]. Text analytics decimate context out of user-generated content based on 
computational linguistics and statistical natural language processing.  
Web analytics are based on HTTP and HTML typed information as well as web 
page updating, log search analysis, and newer areas based on web services and their 
Application Programming Interfaces (API). Network analytics have evolved to include 
link networks and community networks. Network analysts have been trying to depict 
various social network theories and topologies based on connections [36]. Finally, mobile 
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analytics are based around analyzing the various components of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). Each of these areas are not just limited to BI&A 3.0, because as time goes on new 
techniques and algorithms have been crafted to take advantages of the various systems.  
Figure 5. BI&A Research Framework: Foundational Technologies & Research [11] 
 Algorithms Used for Security Data Analytics 
Information Security has long used various data analysis techniques to combat 
cyber security threats. Intrusion detection systems have long used machine learning 
techniques. The security community is now regularly employing more and more machine 
learning techniques into the various suites. However much of the book is geared towards 
introducing information security professionals how to use Analytic languages, such as R.  
Intrusion Detection Systems have employed various supervised and unsupervised 
learning techniques.  Signature based techniques have been commonly been employed 
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and rely on human accounts or application accounts to deploy signatures. Anomaly 
detection intrusion detections use machine learning techniques that can learn from those 
behaviors and can give unseen decisions [53]. 
The various machine learning techniques include, but are not limited to Neural 
Networks, Support Vector Machine, Decision Trees, Genetic Algorithm, Fuzzy Logic 
and Bayesian Networks [24]. Decision trees are used to classify a set of data based on 
previous signatures, but can be limited in detecting new attacks.  Genetic algorithms are 
used to find approximate solutions to a task, and have been used in IDS based on past 
behavior [53].  Fuzzy logic can be used as a classification system when detecting 
intrusions that rely upon predefined rules; however it has known to have issues on large 
datasets [11]. Bayesian Networks are models that predict probably outcomes using prior 
knowledge; however does not handle new features well. Bayes doesn’t work best by 
itself, but as an ensemble methodology alongside other predictive analytics [44]. 
Machine learning for intrusion detection has received a lot of attention because of 
the high promise to learn from the data [10]. As industries become more focused on cyber 
security the security community is going to focus more and more on machine learning 
techniques to help identify new attacks. One of the problems with the techniques that 
have been employed is that they are learning-based systems. Many of the algorithms 
mentioned above rely on known attack vectors. Attackers can use that knowledge and 
obfuscate their attack methods.  
 One well known method of machine learning is behavioral analysis. The main 
algorithms are supervised learning and classification algorithms. The two main 
approaches are Naïve Bayes and Hidden Markov Models [57]. There are well known 
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datasets that have been used for detecting masquerade attacks on UNIX shell commands. 
One of the more popular datasets is Schonlau masquerade data set consisting of over 50 
users [58]. This data set has been used widely in the information security community, but 
has limitations since it only keeps track of the command and not the arguments [59]. It is 
unclear as to whether the dataset contains commands that are “piped” or call external 
commands. Another limitation of the data set is that it is missing enriched data. 
According to Maxion, “the detection of attacks increases 18% to a 70% detection rate due 
to unusual flags used by attackers. 
Big Data Security Analytics – Bringing It Together 
Current tools focus on intrusion prevention. It is good practice to do so, but it 
does not stop intruders. There are security tools, but each has its own command center 
and its own separate analytics systems. Current applications are focused on securing the 
perimeter; including firewalls, IPS, and gateways. There is little to zero coverage for 
advanced malware based upon zero-day vulnerabilities. This is not alluding current 
security environments are not protective, which can prevent known and common attack 
vectors; however, enterprise security following only these guidelines are growing more 
and more effective. Presently there are a large amount of false positives, and there are too 
many tools and manual processes for incident detection.  
Big data security analytics will change the way we look at security incidents and 
response. With Big Data analytics can do automated intelligence thinking and can 
correlate the data from all these heterogeneous sources.  Big Data Analytics can help 
centralize security data monitoring and visualization and storing the data in one place, 
and in its raw format. Using Big Data Security Analytics, organizations can use dynamic 
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self-learning methods needed to detect sophisticated attacks with quicker response times 
than are currently available in traditional security detection [38].  The detection goals for 
a big data security analytics for advanced persistent threats are to detect the existence of 
the attack in the past, understand the goal of the attack and identify the source.  
Big Data analytics can take advantage of web server logs of all incoming, 
outgoing traffic, IP address, times, and session durations. Domain controllers can offer 
user IDs accessing specific IP addresses, times, durations. Content servers can offer a 
detailed account of customer data and access control lists.   
Organizations are already connecting large amounts of data, but they are being 
removed after an allotted amount of time. The data could be collected into one repository 
before being discarded. Advanced analytics can be applied in various areas in security: 
Detect that organization was attacked, find out what the goal was, and then understand 
where the attack came from. There is no single detection algorithm to cover all areas of 
big data security analytics. The issue with APTs is that most information security analysts 
feel vulnerable to the multitude of vendor software their organizations leverage [39]. 
Using analytics on the large volume of network and application data, information security 
analysts will be more prepared to predict and respond to potential attacks. 
There are multiple areas where security can leverage big data analytics to increase 
security responsiveness within an organization. The use cases can include: “External 
malware-based threats, Advanced Persistent Threats, Compliance Monitoring, Insider 
Threats, Risks and compliance management, Reporting on real-time data, Reporting on 
historical data, correlation rules/patterns, fraud detection, and improved queries and 
reports [34].”  Since the application of big data security is a new field there are a 
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multitude of research opportunities in each of these areas. Fraud detection has been used 
in the financial space; however, there is much promise in all these use cases depending on 
the organization’s needs. 
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CHAPTER III 
HADOOP ECOSYSTEM 
Apache Hadoop was created by Doug Cutting. Originally the work was on a 
project called Apache Nutch, which is an open source web crawler. The challenge was to 
be able to store the massive amount of data and have the capability to process the data. 
After reading the 2003 - Google File System and 2004 – MapReduce papers, Cutting was 
inspired to combine the two systems into one combined system that could be handled as a 
data processing and storage framework. Hadoop’s core, known as Hadoop Common, has 
the HDFS, Hadoop Distributed File System, and the MapReduce framework [41]. 
Google File System 
Google’s Research and Development community is constantly releasing new 
research papers in various areas. Their goal is to collaborate with the broader scientific 
community and make a contribution to various fields. Their R&D team consists of 
multiple researchers that hold a Ph.D. with various backgrounds in Computer Science, 
ranging from Algorithms to Distributed Computing. These teams are used to develop new 
products from a research to implementation on Google Infrastructure. In 2003, 2004 and 
2007 Sanjay Ghemawat, et al. and Jeffry Dean released papers that changed the way 
computer architects designed big data applications, which will be reviewed below.   
A paper titled “The Google File System” [18] was released by Google R&D 
department in 2003. The file system, GFS or GoogleGFS, is a distributed file system that 
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is designed to provide reliable and efficient access to data using a large number of 
commodity hardware.  The file system is implemented at Google in a proprietary way, 
however since the release of the paper there have been several attempts to engineer a 
similar system based on the qualities that were released in the paper. 
GoogleGFS was implemented to increase the efficiency and reliability of 
Google’s Search as their processing needs were rapidly growing at the time. Scalability, 
Reliability and Availability running on commodity hardware of their distributed file 
system are the core tenants of their design. The design assumes that it is built from many 
inexpensive commodity hardware components, stores a large number of large files, low 
writes, high reads, and have an easy to use user API [18]. There are key ideas from their 
paper that have translated well to big data analytics frameworks. 
MapReduce Distributed Computing 
Google released another research paper to the public at the end of 2004. This time 
it was based on a programming model used to process large datasets on a large cluster of 
commodity hardware. At MapReduce’s core it is based on functional programming style 
paradigm where the processing doesn’t deal with state variables, but only on the inputs 
and outputs associated with the functions used to process the data. Programs written this 
way are automatically parallelized, distributed, and executed across a large cluster of 
servers. The paper didn’t just propose MapReduce as a theoretical programming 
paradigm, but stated that “thousands of MapReduce jobs were submitted through Google 
each day” [14] [15].  
This system was designed due to the growing complexity in the amount of data 
being stored, and processing was done through very specialized systems for each task. 
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The goal of MapReduce was to abstract out the common processes and hide many of the 
complex programming details such as: parallelization, fault-tolerance, distribution, and 
executing and compiling code across multiple systems. The core of the system is based 
upon the _map_ and _reduce_ pieces of code inherent in the Lisp Programming language. 
Google’s implementation of both the GFS and MapReduce Frameworks are 
written in C/C++. Hadoop is written in Java and provides an API to all major components 
through their Java API. There are some inherent performance debates due to the Hadoop 
being written in a JIT language compared to C++ which is compiled to machine code. 
HDFS is primarily designed to run on large amounts of commodity hardware; 
however, there is multiple cloud organizations that are offering Hadoop as an online 
service, where users can pay for their processing by the amount of CPU and memory 
used. The file system is very similar to existing distributed file systems; however, it is 
more fault-tolerant. It is also designed with similarities using the file system syntax that 
POSIX file systems use and modifies a few of the interfaces.   
The File System is built upon the same Master/Slave architecture as the Google 
File System paper presented. The cluster consists of a single NameNode, the master 
server, which manages the file system and access to files by clients. It is possible to 
create a backup NameNode in case the primary one fails. Files are stored into blocks 
across multiple DataNodes.  Data is replicated to multiple DataNodes creating 
redundancy and improving fault tolerance, the default replication value is three separate 
data nodes. The metadata for each file is stored in the NameNode in memory, but also a 
log file is created for the NameNode for when the system reboots, it can load the 
metadata back into memory. 
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MapReduce is the second core component of the Hadoop common. Both the 
HDFS and MapReduce run on the same systems, that way the processing is loaded from 
disk on the hardware directly into memory, which increases performance of data 
processing. There is Master/Slave architecture to the MapReduce framework. There is 
one primary Resource Manager and each node will have its own Node Manager.  
Figure 6. Overview of Hadoop Distributed File System 
The client will submit a job, the Resource Manager will talk to the NameNode to 
get the location of the data that will be processed then submit the job to the Node 
Manager to pull the data from HDFS. Next the Node Manager will launch a Java 
container that will start the MapReduce tasks. 
The first phase of MapReduce is mapping. Each line of input will be processed 
individually to a function called the Mapper, which will perform some a transformation 
or calculation upon the data and then output that data element. The Map phase takes an 
input pair, and produces a set of key/value pairs. Each output will be sent to a Reducer. 
Map takes something from the record that is meaningful to the client and shuffles and 
sorts the result, then hands it off to the reducer.  
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The reduce function receives the key/value pair and merges the values with the 
key and merges them together. Output from the reduce phase can be sent to a file on the 
HDFS, or it can be sent through another iteration of the MapReduce phase to further 
analyze the data.  It is possible to send the data through MapReduce several times before 
producing the desired output, whether to do some massive calculation or transform the 
data. Reduce aggregates, summarizes, filters, and transforms the data. The data then can 
be sent to another MapReduce job, a file or the output screen. 
Both Map and Reduce are done in parallel and are controlled by the Master node. 
Each line of input is split into X map tasks into chunks of a default size, set in the 
configuration. Reduce phase partitions Y reduce tasks. Tasks are designated to workers 
dynamically. Each worker sends a heartbeat job back to the Master, and if for some 
reason a worker is knocked offline and the master node doesn’t receive a heartbeat back 
from the worker, then the master will designate a new worker for that previous task. The 
master node can consider the location of the data so that the worker can read from disk on 
the same node that the data resides. Since the Master Resource manager monitors the 
workers tasks, the MapReduce portion of Hadoop has built in reliability in case one of the 
worker nodes fails for whatever reason. 
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Figure 7. Overview of Hadoop MapReduce 
MapReduce jobs are powerful, and are the heart of Hadoop; however, they are 
very difficult to write. Hadoop is referenced as an ecosystem is due to the number of 
external products that have been developed as add-ons to Hadoop. Yahoo, Facebook, 
Twitter, and other early adapters have contributed to the ecosystem of Hadoop in some 
way. Pig, Mahout, R Connectors, Hive, and Oozie are perhaps the most popular out of the 
different components of the Hadoop ecosystem. Pig and Hive allow for abstractions built 
on top of MapReduce which allow for a non-programmer friendly environment [17]. 
There are many smaller products, or specialized products, such as Storm, which is 
Twitters real time analytics engine. Hadoop is still going through a growth stage and 
there will most likely have a number of new products in the near future. 
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Figure 8. Apache Hadoop Ecosystem 
 
Apache Spark 
Apache Spark is a high level project that utilizes the power of the Hadoop 
Framework. There are some limitations that are inherent in MapReduce [3] that Spark 
was built to overcome. Spark does not leverage the MapReduce paradigm, due to some 
I/O performance gaps between each MapReduce Job. It uses the Hadoop file system API 
for persistent storage and retrieval; however, Spark has been designed with abstraction in 
mind and has ensured that the framework is not tightly coupled with Hadoop and can 
potentially be connected to future distributed file systems. At this time the current 
projects that are included in the Spark community are: Spark, Spark SQL, Spark 
Streaming, MLib (Machine Learning), and GraphX (Graph based system). Spark can help 
solve some of the issues that are apparent when applying Machine learning techniques to 
Information Security data [42]. 
The internals of Spark are based on a distributed data abstraction introduced at 
Berkeley, known as Resilient Distributed Datasets (RDD). RDDs are fault-tolerant 
abstraction for In-Memory Cluster Computing.  They are immutable, created through 
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data from storage or from another RDD that has been transformed in some way. When an 
RDD is created from another RDD it is through in-memory processes and not stored on 
disks like MapReduce. This has an advantage over the MapReduce processing that is 
inherent in Hadoop. The immutable nature of the distributed dataset is that the 
transformation and actions performed on them must be applied to every element in the 
dataset.  The disadvantage of this abstraction is that working on a datasets that require 
mutable state will not be fully realized in this type of system [46]. 
Spark’s advantage is the speed in which it can process data. There have been 
numerous benchmarks applied to compare Spark to Hadoop’s MapReduce,  that have 
shown if the algorithm is immutable and functional in nature that the speeds can be up to 
20-40x faster. Spark’s computational model allows for quicker real time data analytics 
[40]. The use cases that have been applied with Spark: Conviva Inc., was able to do large 
In-Memory Analytics took 30 minutes versus 20 hours in Hadoop; Mobile Millennium 
was able to model traffic with GPS sensors; and Twitter was able to do Spam 
Classification algorithm, which was able to identify links as spam. 
Discretized Streams (D-Streams) is another model that came out of Berkeley; 
which allows big data applications to process data arriving near real time, which 
overcomes a major challenge in the data analytics community for real time analysis on 
big data [4]. D-Streams allow for fault-tolerant and consistent streaming programming 
model that helps overcome many of the challenges when analyzing data in real time.   D-
Streams build on top of RDDs that partition a series of deterministic batch computations 
on small time deliverables [47]. Spark implements both D-Streams and RDDs to allow 
for scalable real-time analytics processing systems. Currently, D-Streams should handle 
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time intervals greater than half a second. If the requirements are to handle the data in sub 
second intervals, then another technique should be applied.
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CHAPTER IV 
ARCHITECTURE 
Current methods of detecting and following up with security threats are not 
enough in with today’s security threats [1] [10] [62]. Gone are the days where our 
perimeter defenses are enough to deter attacks. Hackers are using a combination of Social 
Engineering and Security know-how to break into organizations systems. Attacks are 
now targeting specific systems, software and hardware. There are various techniques that 
can be used to analyze security threats, that haven’t been a possibility in the past due to 
the large volume and variety of logs. 
The following is a suggested architecture for future big data Security Analytics 
framework. With the rise and research poured into big data Analytics, it is now possible 
to leverage algorithms and strategies that were not available before. This framework is 
not intended in replacing traditional security tools, but will add another layer of detection. 
Advanced Persistent Threats tend to happen within the security perimeter and therefore; 
this technique will compliment traditional perimeter security defense. 
Experiment Setup 
Behavioral analysis and honeypots can be used on a variety of systems (e.g. 
website data, fraud detection, windows users, Linux ssh session). This experiment will be 
focused on using an SSH Honeypot to collect attacker behavior. User data is going to be 
collected using “pacct” and “bash_history.”  
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There are some limited public datasets available; however, it is difficult to find 
SSH honeypot data. Due to the limitation of open public honeypot data, the experiment 
will include a Honeypot to collect data from users over a one month period. Bash profile 
data is widely available. A popular data set used for detecting masqueraded attacks has 
been used to analyze behavioral data [58]. A disadvantage of this data is it only shows the 
commands without the arguments. Hackers target vulnerabilities within a system and the 
arguments of a command can help determine if a user is doing something malicious.  
Once the datasets have been collected they will be placed into HDFS in their raw 
format. All the analysis will be done by cleaning and transforming the raw data into the 
expected data using regular expressions. Every command to transform the data will be in 
the Appendix and all data will be stored within HDFS so that the experiment is 
reproducible using the same datasets.  
Using Naïve Bayes, the datasets can be broken into two classifications: bad actor 
and good actor. The first 5000 commands of each of the user accounts are good actor 
behavior and honeypot data is bad actor behavior. One of the limitations with these data 
sets is that it only has the first command and doesn’t have any enhanced fields, such as 
flags or arguments passed into the commands [59].  
Raspberry PI Honey Pot 
Raspberry PI is a miniscule computer that was originally targeted for a young 
audience. This project started back in 2006 at the University of Cambridge. Originally the 
idea was to provide a small affordable computer, twenty-five to thirty-five dollars, for 
kids to learn the principles of computer science before attending a University.  The 
Raspberry PI project has spawned off its own community of developers sharing ideas on 
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how utilize the computational power of the tiny credit card sized unit. There have been 
many projects that can show the different types of projects for Information Security.  
The Honeypot that was used in this experiment ran on a Raspberry PI model B+ 
with the CanaKit running a Linux based OS. The CPU was 700 MHz with 512 MB of 
memory with a 4 GB hard drive. Raspberry PI as a honeypot was a good option due to 
how inexpensive it was to implement and that it has a low power usage footprint. With 
this set up it would be easy to install multiple sensors fairly cheaply to collect data from 
multiple points.  
Tweaking the system (/etc/proc) files allowed the system to look like it was more 
powerful system using 48 cores and 128 GB of ram. The system was exposed to the 
internet through port forwarding SSH traffic from a Cisco router that is connected to the 
Internet. The default port for SSH is 22; however the system was configured to accept 
SSH traffic through port 4576. Kippo’s documentation suggests listening to port 2222; 
however, it is not a recommended setting due to the popularity of using this port for 
Kippo and other SSH Honeypots.  
There are multiple open source honeypots that are readily available. This project 
the SSH Kippo was chosen. Kippo is a simple Python script that emulates a shell. It has 
been commonly used for monitoring brute force attacks and also emulates “most” shell 
commands. A primary reason this system was chosen is due to its ability to mimic the 
UNIX file system that allows for fake file contents to commonly used files 
(e.g./etc/passwd and/etc/proc). Even though Kippo mimics POSIX file systems fairly 
well, it is worth doing some customization in order to lure attackers to stay longer. 
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Figure 9. Big Data Security Analytics Architecture 
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Big Data Architecture for the Experiment 
Figure 4.2 is a model that can be abstracted out for various big data Analytics 
systems. However the diagram depicts the various sensors that may be present within a 
network system that provide traffic logs of various systems and users within an 
organization. The goal isn’t to collect every log available, but to actually bring value 
from the potential insight provided by those log data [22]. This diagram could easily 
include the organizations firewall boundaries so that we can have different areas within a 
network being logged.  
This experiment used 4 Virtual Machine (VM) servers. Each server had 4 CPUs 
with 2 cores per socket. A total of 16 GB for the Name Node/Master server and 8 GB 
RAM for each of the slave nodes were allocated to the VMs. The master server needs 
more RAM than the slave servers because that server keeps track of where all the files are 
stored within HDFS and is the master node for any Spark jobs which can be memory 
intensive processes. Each of the nodes only had about 128 GB of Hard drive space each, 
this is primarily due to testing purposes. This allowed for over 500 GB of total disk 
space. This amount is not really enough to be considered big data, it is enough to enable 
proof of concept and development as both MapReduce and Spark scale really well [48]. 
The servers are running Ubuntu 14.04 with several dependencies. The “/etc/host” 
files on each server need to have a row inserted for each server in the cluster. Whenever a 
server is added to the cluster the “/etc/host” file on each server should be modified. It 
would be worth containing one master file that can be distributed across the cluster so 
that new servers can be added with ease. Each node has the same configuration for 
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Hadoop and Spark the configuration files are updated on the master server, but are 
distributed to the other nodes within the cluster.  
There are several dependencies that each server has installed. Apache Spark is 
built on top of Scala 2.10+, Python 2.6+ and Java 6+. It’s possible to program in any of 
the three languages, but was written primarily in Scala with a functional programming 
paradigm. Python is a popular choice due to the number of advanced analytic libraries 
like Numpy and h5py. HBase is another high level apache project that was installed; it 
can be used as a columnar data store.  The primary packages are described in further 
detail in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 10. Hadoop / Spark Experiment Architecture 
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Figure 10 is the infrastructure setup for the cluster set up for the experiment 
described in chapter 5.  The overall high level view of the architecture on how the 
different systems are connected. Every system uses port 22 to move data around. The 
internal Hadoop/Spark system uses password less SSH to communicate with one another. 
Figure 11 below is the overall analytics architecture. Honeypot data is continually 
monitored and updates the Honeypot Behavior model. User historical command data are 
continually updated within HDFS. If the data isn’t considered bad the user profile model 
needs to be updated with the new data. The method checks user model behavioral 
analysis against both its own previous data and known bad actor behavior that is 
generated by honeypot data.   
  
Figure 11. Honeypot Behavior Analytics Engine 
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Naïve Bayes Algorithm for the Experiment 
There are several classification algorithms that can be used for this type of 
experiment; however for simplicity a variant of Naïve Bayes was used. Naïve Bayes is 
easy, robust and can be fairly powerful in classification. The algorithm used in this 
experiment is very successful in spam detection; and therefore was chosen to identify bad 
behavior from a Honeypot and Good Behavior from trained user behavior. Using Bayes 
theorem it we can calculate the probability that a bad actor event Y, given the observed 
training data from a Honeypot, given as X [44]. 
𝑃(𝑋|𝑌)= 
𝑃(𝑌|𝑋)∗𝑃(𝑋)
𝑃(𝑌)
 
This formula is a proven method and has been used in a variety of practical 
applications in multiple fields. This theorem is the cornerstone of Bayesian Statistics, 
which can calculate the probability of an event that is happening based on earlier 
probability known estimates based on historical data. Using this type of formula to detect 
behavior data has been used in masquerade detection on bash profile. The formula often 
has been overlooked due to the constant changes in user behavior.  
One approach to estimate the probability that a command is issued by a bad actor 
is to take the probability of that command being used by the bad actor by the total times 
(i.e., N) that enriched command has been used by both good actors and bad actors. This 
will give estimation that the theoretical probability that the command is executed by a 
bad actor increases. The formula used for this common Bayes Implementation is as 
follows: The formula below is the number of occurrences of a bad actor giving command 
x over the total of bad actors and good actors giving the command x. 
𝑃𝑀𝐿𝐸 (𝑥𝑖) = 
|1𝑥𝑖|
𝑁
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One drawback of using the Naïve Bayes is that the formula assumes that every 
command is given equal weight for both bad actors and good actors [44]. There are more 
sophisticated implementations of Naïve Bayes that use additional context.  Building in 
additional context requires a more sophisticated model, which would take time and 
analysis. 
Honeypots can provide robust data concerning malicious behavior due to the data 
having a very high positive rate, since only a bad actor would attempt to do anything on 
the system. With a high level of confidence that the data collected from a Production 
Honeypot it is possible to predict malicious behavior. Masquerade attacks have shown 
that attackers will use enriched commands differently that can deviate from good actor or 
a specific actors behavior [59].   
 These are two of the simpler versions of Bayes Theorem; however, they are still 
powerful enough to test the architecture. Some of the more advanced theorems require an 
iterative approach. The data analytics framework in this experiment would pair well with 
the iterative algorithms where traditional systems have issues providing a timely 
response. With frameworks like Apache Spark it may be possible to get near real time 
results. Similar architecture using big data frameworks have proven to scale for other 
domains [46].
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Kippo was primarily used as a way to create groups of behaviors that could be 
seen as bad. Originally the intention was to get real data instead of faking all of the data 
used for detection. However this turned out to be an exciting part of the experiment as 
explained below due to the interesting findings found.   
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) proved to have several technical 
challenges. Setting the system in distributed mode was fairly difficult; however the most 
frustrating challenge was when the NameNode was lost and some of the core data was 
lost in a binary format that only the lost NameNode meta-store could read.  
Apache Spark was the analytics engine chosen to carry out the analysis since it 
can operate on Hadoops HDFS and through the cluster as a replacement for MapReduce. 
PySpark is the version of Spark used since it has an interactive shell, which makes for a 
faster development cycle after (painfully) trying to write MapReduce code in Java. 
Another advantage of using Spark is that it does equally well with smaller data sets as it 
does with large datasets. The properties of Apache Spark scale well when a solution is 
going to be analyzing several streams of data, and if switching the dataset to real time. 
The data used in this experiment were saved in HDFS, and in raw form. 
Traditional databases require that the data is cleaned and formatted into a schema first 
design. With HDFS and MapReduce/Spark it is easy to keep the data in is raw format and 
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apply a schema at runtime. This schema-second capability is what separates big data 
architectures like Hadoop and HDFS from traditional RDMS. 
Interesting Kippo Findings 
There were many interesting insights that were gleaned from using a SSH 
honeypot that were unrelated to the analysis that was the primary focus of this thesis. The 
information that can be mined from just the default configuration with a Kippo server can 
be useful for understanding attack vector trends. 
Often a quick Google search would reveal the hidden meaning of some of the 
attacks, especially some of the obscure software names. Many of the hacks were trying to 
install an IRC Bot. One of the IRC hacks that were common was to install a system called 
psyBNC. This program turned out to be a popular IRC Bouncer that allows users to hide 
their IP addresses; it can also be used for malicious attacks as well as a way to redirect 
attacks from the host machine, among other things. One of the areas worth exploring for 
other research is the various ways these common packages are installed, because not 
every attempt goes about the same method.  
 Most of the hacks used Perl and would give up after some sort of Perl 
segmentation fault. Kippo tries to fake package installation as best as it can; however, as 
soon as a hacker encounters some sort of segmentation fault it immediately gives up. 
There were numerous attempts at trying to install some sort of Bitcoin miner to steal CPU 
cycles from the host. Worth noting are numerous hackers that try to masquerade as 
common processes such as httpd or even MySQL daemon accounts. There are a lot of 
clever hacks and tricks that try to avoid and blend in to the system background. 
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One of the limitations using Kippo is that it has minimal interactivity. Kippo tries 
hard to mimic a real Linux shell; however, due to the low connectivity time against the 
server, it appears that attackers abandon the sessions fairly quickly. After the experiment 
was over and the logs were collected and analyzed it was clear that using a common 
usernames and passwords would scare away any serious attackers. Any future 
experiments it is recommended to use stronger credentials to better mimic a real system. 
It would also be beneficial to use a system that can better emulate a POSIX Unix server 
to better entice attackers to stay and execute more commands against the server. 
The figure below is a chart of the top 20 commands. The total number of attempts 
against this particular honey pot was 1,210,028. The two usernames excluded from the 
graph were admin and root because they comprised of over half the total username 
attempts. It’s worth noting that “pi” was roughly 3% of the attempted passwords. 
 
Figure 12. Top 20 Kippo Usernames 
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The top commands were much more varied. Below is an image of the top first 
commands. The most used commands were ls, and wget. It’s interesting that the first 
thing an attacker attempts to do is connect to a web server and download software. The 
server is usually by IP address and not by name. Command wget is used to download 
software off the internet. Most traditional masquerading detection systems use only the 
command name and not the arguments [58]. Using the argument of the command the 
system can record the name of the software being downloaded which can give even more 
information about the deviant behavior. 
 
 
Figure 13. Top First Kippo Commands 
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Sanitizing Honeypot Data 
After collecting data it was apparent that using an easy username and password 
combination for the honeypot deterred attackers. Some of the users would leave after 
committing one or two commands. However, despite users not staying long, the number 
of commands was more than enough to analyze.  
Kippo Honeypot data is semi-structured data. There are projects that store data 
into MySQL; however there are performance hits and limitations when a honeypot is 
under heavy use. Spark works very efficiently with unstructured and semi-structured 
data. Spark-shell and PySpark are interactive REPL that allow for quick data exploration 
on distributed datasets.  Regular expressions are used heavily to get the data into a usable 
format. “wget” and “curl” are common commands that are used by attackers within the 
honeypot; therefore, any commands that download software form the Internet will 
remove the IP address and only take the name of the software being downloaded. 
The main limitation of the overall experimental data is due to the type of 
honeypot used. The main reason Kippo was chosen was because it’s a highly used SSH 
honeypot with good documentation and tutorials. Production honeypots are becoming 
more popular by organizations. It is important to disguise the honeypot as a real system.  
To make sure that the commands had enriched detail (e.g. flags and the first 
argument) were kept as a whole. Appendix G has the commands in Scala used to sanitize 
the commands into a standard format. Sanitizing them into a standard is important to 
standardizing a way in which we apply the Naïve Bayes formula as discussed in Chapter 
IV. The implementation used in this experiment is very narrow due to a small set of data 
that was collected through the Honeypot. 
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Conclusion from the Analysis 
Eighty percent of the data was used for training and the remaining was employed 
for testing purposes. Using the results with enriched commands; the accuracy presented 
around 83%. Issuing the first command the rate was far worse at around 33% accuracy. 
This was in part due to the use of common commands. Adding in the command flags 
adds a lot more variety in how the users used the system. Certain flags are almost perfect 
in interactive usability testing. 
Applying a four node Apache Spark cluster the analysis on five hundred 
megabyte datasets completed in less than one second. Spark has the ability to scale; 
therefore can easily give responses that are acceptable for quick response time when 
analyzing attacker data. The solution creates real time results from new honeypot data 
and updated behavioral data.  
Combining the analysis of the probability of a bad actor using a SSH honeypot 
along with modelling normal user behavior with new user behavior creates an ensemble 
method. The system will keep a history of all commands that a user has made along with 
a timestamp. When a user uses a command or a flag that is not in their history, the 
probability that the command is executed by a bad actor combined with data analysis 
against normal behavior versus honeypot behavior creates an ensemble method to create 
a more accurate probability.  
Ensemble analysis is not limited to just one formula within the architecture 
described in this thesis. All network data and application data that can provide useful 
analysis that can be correlated in the same timeframe can create a more accurate picture 
of an attack. For example, if there is unusual increased network traffic that exceeds a 
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specific threshold while at the same time there are multiple potential bad actors that were 
defined through comparing honeypot analysis against behavioral analysis the probability 
there is a bad actor is significantly increased with higher confidence.  
The real time analysis is only one portion of the overall solution. While the 
analysis is going against historical data, new attack vectors are constantly updated. The 
raw data is stored within HDFS unaltered. The data required is transformed 
programmatically into the desired format for analysis. As new attack vectors are stored, 
it’s possible to rerun historical analysis to see if there were any probabilities that an 
attack has already happened that was before identified. Historical attacks can alert 
analysis to investigate and correlate previous potential attacks. 
Example Scenario of Honeypot Ensemble Analysis 
 Figure 5.3 is a visual representation of an attack and analysis scenario. The 
following scenario is based on APT scenarios using UIT attack patterns [38] [51] [59]. 
This scenario assumes a zero day attack vulnerability being released according to Figure 
2.1. The honeypot ensemble analysis architecture in figure 5.3 is based on the 
architecture presented in Figure 4.3.  
This scenario assumes that a new vulnerability has been identified on a Bash 
system. Bad actors will try to exploit that vulnerability on massive servers throughout IP 
addresses on the Internet [54]. Since the honeypot is not a production based system that is 
used by normal users; therefore, only bad actors will attempt connections [26]. New bash 
shell command signatures will be collected from the honeypot and sent to the honeypot 
ensemble analysis architecture. 
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During this time, an UIT that has penetrated the organization’s intranet uses the 
same commands to exploit an internal facing server against the known vulnerability. The 
UIT is successfully giving the UIT privileged access to the system. Commands executed 
on the internal facing server are collected into the honeypot ensemble analysis 
architecture. The commands are parsed and analyzed using the command parser in 
Appendix G. Probability that the command is a bad actor command is calculated by 
checking whether or not that command with enriched flags has been executed by that user 
before, if that command has been used by only bad actors on the honeypot, and how 
recent that attack vector has been recorded through honeypot analysis.  
 
Figure 14. Example Honeypot Analysis Scenario 
 Multiple outcomes of the automated analysis can occur. One – the probability and 
the weight of the analysis can send in automated alerts for analysts to check the account 
on the internal facing server. Two – the account can be monitored for a set number of 
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alerts in a time period or within a number of executed commands. Three – some kind of 
prescriptive event could happen (e.g. the account’s password could be reset so that the 
legitimate user contacts support to reset the password). Each of these outcomes has 
tradeoffs, but they are all possible outcomes. The Naïve Bayes implementation described 
in this thesis is not as context rich as other algorithms (e.g. support vector machines 
[11]); therefore, it may not be robust enough to trigger external events, such as locking 
out the user account. 
How This Experiment Differs From Previous Research 
This experiment was inspired by unrelated journal articles. One of the primary 
inspirations for this experiment was based on a 2013 paper, Future directions for 
behavioral information security research. Three future information security themes for 
behavioral analysis are: “Differentiate insider deviant behavior from insider 
misbehavior,” “Improve methods for collecting and measuring security related data,” 
“Capture actual behavior [13].”  
Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat, was an article that inspired the use of a 
honeypot to collect bad actor data. Their study was limited to deploying a honeypot 
within a firewall in order to detect insider threat since connections external to their 
network couldn’t connect to the system [54]. Combining the ideas from both papers gave 
the idea to differentiate bad actor behavior from normal behavior through capturing only 
bad actor attempts against a fake system.  
Hadoop and machine learning have been used in recent studies for automated 
detection. One of the studies focused on automating analysis against a honeypot to 
identify bots that have been deployed within an organizations network [62]. Another 
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study was for automatic analysis of malware using machine learning techniques [61]. 
Both of these studies influenced the use of Hadoop ecosystem for behavioral analysis. 
Behavioral analysis has been well studied within information security. Intrusion 
detection system utilizes anomaly detection for network access patterns [53]. One 
drawback of this approach is that the IDS focus on the access patterns of network based 
traffic and not what users are doing on an application or system. Application profiles 
offer more robust data sets; however, there is no standard format for how applications 
collect user interactions. 
Within Linux systems there are standard logging for shell interaction. Numerous 
behavioral analysis studies have used bash profiles for anomaly detection within Linux. 
A variety of algorithms have been used for masquerade detection against these profiles 
(e.g. Naïve Bayes and Hidden Markov Models) [59].  There are some drawbacks to some 
of the studies. Data points need to be collected on a user for an initial in order to reliably 
identify whether a new action is a deviation from normal behavior [60]. 
This experiment is different from previous approaches in that it collects bad actor 
behavior on a system that only bad actors would access [54][56]. The bad actor data can 
be used to compile a known bad actor profile. If a user commits a series of actions that 
deviate from their normal behavior and those actions correspond with known bad actor 
behavior, then the probability that the action is done by a bad actor is increased.  
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CHAPTER VI 
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION 
Information security can benefit from the new data analytics architectures 
analyzing heterogeneous sets of data to identify potential security breaches. Attacks are 
becoming more complex and sophisticated; therefore detection and analysis need to be in 
place to accurately identify and prevent attacks that can compromise an organizations 
network. 
Limitations of the Experiment 
 There were several limitations of this experiment so that it wasn’t trying to test 
too many variables. It was limited in only advanced logging shell sessions and data 
gathered from a honeypot. The more heterogeneous data points that can be collected and 
aggregated to show similar data at the time of an attack can greatly improve the 
probability that an attack has occurred. The experiment would benefit from a larger more 
complete dataset. Even though there were over 2 million events with this honeypot, only 
a fraction of the events were commands. The commands did provide insight as the 
patterns used on the honeypot were much different than normal user behavior. 
 The honeypot that was used is an open source product that has powerful 
capabilities for a SSH Honeypot. The configuration allows administrators to add 
capabilities for advanced session information to mimic a Linux shell. Future security 
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architecture research can dynamically route false positives masquerade attack occurring 
on a Linux server to a honeypot server. This could be used to help automatically 
determine if a potential attack is a false positive or a false negative. The experiment could 
have benefitted from both more honeypot data as well as user data. 
 Maximum likelihood Naïve Bayes  
Future Research 
Behavioral analysis on Honeypots to build a data driven security system are 
excellent candidates for future research in the information security field as well as 
academia. SSH command behavior isn’t the only type of behavior. Exploring HTTP 
Honeypot user behavior would be a good research area to explore with honeypots to 
detect unknown attack vectors. With attacks such as “Heartbleed,” a honeypot could help 
identify the attack vector before it is announced into public attention. 
 Data driven security is rising in popularity due to frameworks such as Hadoop and 
Spark. The rise of Data Science as an occupation makes it appealing for information 
security organizations to focus on data driven products using machine learning for 
predictive and prescriptive capabilities. This research used a data analytics framework 
with honeypot data to create a predictive model that can help detect unknown attack 
vectors using behavioral analysis on SSH systems. 
Conclusion 
The experiment in this thesis was to use big data architecture within a security 
context to analyze potential bad actors within a network. Behavioral ensemble analysis 
using an SSH honeypot proved to be a successful solution for detecting unknown threats 
within real time analysis. There are two benefits of using honeypot behavioral analysis in 
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combination with normal user behavioral analysis. First, it allows security analysts to 
identify when a user has bad actor behaviors. Second, the solution is robust enough to 
identify changes in bad actor behavior and potential new attack vectors. Using enriched 
command analysis, this experiment was able to take into account changes in how bad 
actors use different command flags in new ways.  
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APPENDIX A 
KIPPO INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION 
 
 Kippo is an Open Source project. Google code used to host the project; however it 
has since moved to GitHub. Since the project is open source it is easy to configure the 
server to either collect additional data or customize the system to serve the end user’s 
needs. Kippo is written in python and requires python and python-twisted installed on the 
system in order to run. 
Kippo Open Source Honeypot Location - https://github.com/desaster/kippo 
INSTALLING KIPPO – Installation on Debian 
Install Python:  
Twisted Python:  
Install SSHD 
/etc/ssh/sshd_config  
Restart SSHD 
Add kippo user 
Download Kippo
sudo  apt-get install python-twisted 
 
sudo  apt-get install python 
 
sudo apt-get install openssh-server  
 
Port 5576 
 sudo service ssh restart 
 sudo service ssh restart 
 
wget http://kippo.googlecode.com/files/kippo-0.5.tar.gz 
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INSTALLING KIPPO – Installation on Debian (Continued): 
Untar Kippo 
Redirect SSH 
 
Configure FS 
 
 
 
authBind setting  
create file 
Configure start.sh 
Start Kippo  
  
Once Kippo is started users can attempt to connect to Kippo. All the logs are 
stored at kippo.log within the Kippo directory. The logs aren’t in a great format to parse, 
which is why Kippo/Honeypot was used in this experiment. Attacker information is 
captured by any connections made to the Honeypot SSH server including the attackers: 
IP information, Port, Username/password, and RSA Id. 
It is possible to configure Kippo further. The kippo.tac file contains the various 
username and passwords that users can connect to. By default this is root and 123456; 
which can actually scare hackers away. It is best if that configuration is changed. Kippo 
is written in python; and is pretty easy to add in custom logging and configuration; 
documentation on Twisted API can help configure the system further. 
There are plenty of resources on Kippo’s home page. A proficient python 
programmer will want to look through the source code. Advanced functionality can be 
easily added to Kippo by extending Python functionality. 
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 22 j REDIRECT --to-
port 5576 
 
Tar –xzf kippo-0.5.tar.gz –C /opt sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p 
tcp --dport 22 -j REDIRECT --to-port 4633 
/opt/kipp-0.5/utils/creatfs.py > fs.pickle 
 Echo “Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server release 6.5 (Santiago) \n  \l > 
honeyfs/etc/issue 
 
 
authbind Twistd –y kippo.tac –l log/kippo.log –pidfill kippo.pid 
 
Apt-get install authbind 
 Touch /etc/authbind/byport/22 
./start.sh 
 
 70 
 
APPENDIX B 
INSTALLING AND CONFIGURING HADOOP 
 Currently there are two separate versions of Hadoop.  Hadoop 1’s processing 
model is oriented towards MapReduce and batch oriented jobs. The Hadoop’s 
architecture is for the most part the same. The biggest differences are between how 
HDFS is used in Hadoop 1 and YARN is used in Hadoop 2. 
 Hadoop 1 is a single Namenode that keeps metadata about each file and directory 
within Hadoop. Hadoop 2 uses HDFS federation which allows for multiple Namenodes 
to manage multiple namespaces and allow for greater scalability. Most of the differences 
are in the administration of the cluster and performance, and doesn’t affect the way 
developers and analysts use the cluster (for the most part).YARN allows for multiple 
applications to share the resources of the Hadoop Ecosystem. 
Installing Hadoop: 
Download Hadoop  
 
Extract hadoop 
Create hadoopuser 
Generate SSHkeys 
Create sshkeys  
Configure core-site 
wget http://mirrors.gigenet.com/apache/hadoop/common/hadoop-
2.6.0/hadoop-2.6.0.tar.gz 
 
tar –xzf hadoop-2.6.0.tar.gz /C /opt/ 
useradd –s /bin/bash –m –d /home/hadoopuser hadoopuser 
ssh-keygen [Press enter : enter again : No passphrase ] 
Cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 
Name = edgenode || edgenode:9000 
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Edit \etc\hosts (e.g.  
4 Nodes) 
 
 
 
Copy Hadoop and 
SSH Keys to Other 
Environments 
 Configure all the hadoop servers the same. Verify that the primary server/edge 
node can ssh to each of the slave nodes without password. This is important because 
Hadoop starts and communicates to each of the slave nodes through SSH. The 
/opt/hadoop/conf/slaves file on the serer needs to contain each of the host addresses for 
communications. 
Format HDFS:  
Start HDFS:   
Start Mapred:  
Verify Working 
 
Installing and configuring Spark: 
Download Spark:  
Untar Spark 
 Configuring spark, the administrator will need to edit the file 
/opt/spark/conf/spark-env.sh file. The environment variables need to be set: 
SPARK_MASTER_IP : PrimaryHadoop. Configure the /opt/spark/conf/slaves file to 
contain all the other addresses that were set in the “/etc/hosts” file.  
Copy to each  
Environment 
 
Start Spark 
192.168.12.10  PrimaryHadoop 
192.168.12.11  SecondHadoop 
192.168.12.12  TertiaryHadoop 
192.168.12.13  QuadHadoop 
ssh secondhadoop “/sbin/cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys” 
<~/.ssh/rsa_id.pub 
/opt/hadoop/bin/hadoop primaryhadoop -format 
/opt/hadoop/bin/start-dfs.sh 
/opt/hadoop/bin/start-mapred.sh 
/opt/hadoop/bin/hdfs dfs –ls / 
wget http://www.apache.org/dyn/closer.cgi/spark/spark-
1.2.1/spark-1.2.1.tgz 
tar –xzf spark-1.2.1.tgz /C /opt/ 
scp /opt/spark/* secondhadoop:/opt/spark 
/opt/spark/sbin/start-all.sh 
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APPENDIX C  
ANALYSIS OF HOME DEPOT ATTACK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3rd Party Failed 
to Keep Credentials 
Into Home Depot 
Systems Secure 
Hacker’s Obtained Third Party 
Credentials, but it didn’t give them direct 
access to the system they eventually broke 
into the system. 
Breached 
Perimeter Defenses with 
Stolen Credentials  
Hacker’s used their access to gain 
elevated privileges within the network. 
Breached further within 
the network using Elevated 
privileges  
Developed and Deployed Custom-
Built Malware on Home Depot’s Self-
Checkout System 
Using Legitimate credentials hackers were able to bypass traditional security 
perimeter defense systems and steal 53 million credit card numbers and email 
addresses. It is unknown how long the breach was there, but the only thing 
Home Depot did to stop the attack was to take away the legitimate 
credentials.  The credentials used to breach the security system were 
legitimate; however it was possible to see the change in behavior. 
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APPENDIX D 
  
ANALYSIS OF CHASE MULTI-STAGE ATTACK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Spear Phishing Campaign 
targeting multiple banks, 
including JP Morgan Chase. The 
Phishing attack wasn’t discovered 
till August but took place in 
May/June. 
Chase Employees fell for the 
Phishing attempt, giving hackers 
credentials to access internal 
Chase Servers bypassing 
traditional perimeter defense and 
IDS software. 
Using legitimate credentials, hackers were 
able to penetrate internal servers. JP 
Morgan only disclosed that approx. 83 
million were affected and that the 
intruders looked at internal software code. 
The Breach was detected 
in July; however they 
didn’t disclose the breach 
until August. 
The hacker’s just “lingered” within the system. IT appears as if they only 
used the credentials a handful of times. Chase believes that the hackers were 
trying to see how far they could penetrate the system and possibly do some 
surveillance on their network systems. Either way this attack  could have 
been much worse if the attackers installed custom-made malware that could 
further penetrate and monitor Chase’s systems 
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APPENDIX E 
ADVANCED BASH HISTORY SETUP 
The following command will add some parameters to the bash_history. By Default the 
bash_history is just the command and parameters. It’s possible to do further changes to 
bash_history, but for the purpose of this project was to only make minor modifications 
for repeatability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
#!/bin/bash 
# This script should be run on every user's account on creation.  
 
USER_HOME=$(echo ~) 
BASHRCL=$USER_HOME/.bashrc 
 
# Change the output of the bash history format so that it shows timestamp 
echo ''export HISTTIMEFORMAT = ' %F %T ' '' >> $BASHRCL 
 
# Change the .bash_history so that the bash history file size is larger than 
normal 
echo ''export HISTSIZE=20000'' >> $BASHRCL 
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APPENDIX F 
SCALA COMMANDS TO ANALYZE HONEYPOT DATA 
The following commands were used to do analysis on the honeypot data within 
Hadoop. These are basic map and filter commands that do string manipulation on the logs 
to get the relevant data out. 
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APPENDIX G 
SCALA PARSER FOR ENRICHED COMMANDS 
The following functions are used to transform bash commands into enriched 
commands so that we can look at any unusual flags or software downloaded. 
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APPENDIX H 
SCALA NAÏVE BAYES TRAINING COMMANDS 
 The following functions are used to train Naïve Bayes for the honeypot data 
against behavior commands. 
